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BANK RECAPITALIZATIONS:
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
We have been here before. No matter how different the latest financial frenzy
or crisis always appears, there are usually remarkable similarities with past
experience from other countries and from history.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Trouble Asset Relief Fund (“TARP”)2 was created in panic. Faced
with a financial crisis unprecedented in scope and severity, Congress gave
the United States Department of the Treasury $700 billion, with enormous
latitude on how to spend the funds.3 By all accounts, TARP was instrumental
in stabilizing the financial system and setting the foundation for economic
recovery.4 Yet its expiration, on October 3, 2010, was little mourned.5 As the
crisis faded, government officials publicly expressed their intentions to
never again deploy a TARP-like program: “[t]here will be no more taxpayer
funded bailouts—period.”6
The fundamental problems of TARP are widely acknowledged on edito-
rial pages and amongst academic commentators.7 In particular, the robust
oversight TARP received throughout its lifetime provided illuminating as-
1 CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES
OF FINANCIAL FOLLY xxv (2009).
2 TARP was created under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”),
which became law on October 3, 2008. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110–343, 122 Stat. 3765 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
3 See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 167–68 (2010).
4 See Neel Kashkari, Interim Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury for Financial Stability, U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks at The Brookings Institution (Jan. 8, 2009); Has Dodd-Frank
Ended Too Big to Fail?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. and Bailouts of
Pub. and Private Programs of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong.
42–43 (2011) (statement of Timothy G. Massad, Acting Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury).
5 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, SEPTEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: ASSESSING THE TARP ON
THE EVE OF ITS EXPIRATION 95 (2010).
6 Remarks on Financial Regulatory Reform and an Exchange with Reporters, 2010 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-passage-financial-regulatory-reform.
7 See, e.g., Simon Johnson, TARP, the Long Goodbye, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Sept.
30, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/tarp-the-long-goodbye
(arguing that TARP was “excessively generous to the financial executives” of the saved insti-
tutions, failed to seize upon an opportunity to “change the structure and the incentives of Wall
Street,” and ineffective at preventing future bailouts); Will Wilkinson, How Effective Was
TARP, Really?, ECONOMIST DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA BLOG (Oct. 8, 2010, 21:11), http://www.
economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/10/public_opinion_and_bailouts (summariz-
ing the ambivalent reactions of several academic experts).
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sessments of the program’s design and performance.8 The overseers identi-
fied various problems, such as the failure to improve small business’ access
to credit, the lack of transparency in its implementation, and most impor-
tantly, the creation of moral hazard.9 Although the merits of these criticisms
have been much debated, there has been little discourse on reforms were a
similar crisis to arise in the future.
The central reason for this failure to plan for a scenario where the gov-
ernment is once again forced to bail out financial institutions is regulators’
burgeoning faith in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)10 and its newly-created tools to address the fun-
damental failures in the financial system.11 Passed in the wake of the
government interventions of 2008 and 2009, Dodd-Frank gives the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) the authority to resolve and break
apart certain large financial firms whose imminent failure would threaten the
stability of the financial system.12 The FDIC and other financial regulators
have promised that this new tool will reduce the chance that future taxpayer
bailouts will be necessary.13
But the success of Dodd-Frank is far from certain. Importantly, the fu-
ture of taxpayer bailouts hinges on the ability and willingness of the FDIC to
use its new authority, in coordination with other federal regulators, and to
insist on organizational changes well before the onset of a crisis. Reflecting
the general skepticism on this point, the Nobel laureate and Columbia Uni-
versity Professor Joseph E. Stiglitz has argued that the Dodd-Frank resolu-
tion authority “has made little difference, because few believe that the
government will ever use the authority at its disposal with [ ] too-big-to-fail
banks.”14 In January of 2011, Moody’s Investors Service, one of the world’s
most influential credit rating agencies, announced its belief that the resolu-
tion regime “will not work as planned, posing a contagion risk and most
8 When Congress created TARP, it also created two independent overseers. EESA man-
dated the appointment of a Special Inspector General for the TARP program (“SIGTARP”)
and required the SIGTARP to submit quarterly reports to Congress. Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. Law No. 110-343, §121(a), (f), 122 Stat. 3765, 3788, 3790. It
also created a bipartisan Congressional Oversight Panel (“COP”) and required it to submit
regular reports to Congress. Id. § 125.
9 See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 5, at 97–99; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, R
DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: TAKING STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM ACHIEVED? 95 (2010).
10 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
11 See, e.g., Has Dodd-Frank Ended Too Big to Fail?, supra note 4, at 6. R
12 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394 (Supp. V 2011) (establishing orderly liquidation authority for
nonbank financial companies).
13 See Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Report Examines How an Orderly Resolution of Leh-
man Brothers Could Have Been Structured Under the Dodd-Frank Act (Apr. 18, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11076.html.
14 An Overall Assessment of TARP and Financial Stability: Hearing on Impact of the
TARP on Financial Stability Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 112th Cong. 4–6 (2011) (state-
ment of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Univ. Professor, Columbia Univ.).
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likely forcing the government to provide support in order to avoid a systemic
crisis.”15
Because of the potential for future taxpayer bailouts, it is prudent to
develop a framework for a rescue program if the time came—one that ad-
dresses TARP’s perceived failures. This Article surveys recent foreign recap-
italization schemes to provide insights into how such a program should be
designed. It focuses on recapitalization schemes because the cornerstone of
TARP was a capital injection initiative, the Capital Purchase Program
(“CPP”). For the most part, it examines the most acute phase of the global
financial crisis, between September 2008 and December 2009, because com-
parisons between the U.S. and European policy responses is least tainted by
contextual differences in this timeframe.16
This Article offers six suggestions for improving the CPP. First, a fu-
ture TARP should differentiate between beneficiaries according to their risk
profiles. Had the Treasury differentiated in its treatment of healthy and dis-
tressed banks, it could have obtained more appropriate compensation for the
taxpayers’ risk and reduced moral hazard by imposing harsher behavioral
constraints on distressed banks. Second, capital injections to weaker institu-
tions should be conditioned on more stringent non-price terms. The recapi-
talization programs under TARP created distorted ex ante incentives by their
failure to include restructuring requirements or punish incumbent executives.
Third, the Treasury should prevent major institutions from opting out of the
program to avoid undesirable market responses towards participating banks.
Fourth, large and small banks should be recapitalized under different terms,
tailored to their respective needs and ability to repay. Fifth, the Treasury
should avoid lending requirements, which appear ineffective, and instead
consider direct lending to small businesses and credit mediation. Finally, the
Treasury should, in budgeting and management considerations, prepare for
the possibility that multiple tranches of capital could be necessary in order to
stabilize the financial sector.
This Article is divided into four sections. In Part II, I present a critique
of the CPP, arguing that its design hindered the effectiveness of the bailout
and created moral hazard. In Part III, I survey the recapitalization programs
15 Has Dodd-Frank Ended Too Big to Fail?, supra note 4, at 21 (statement of Neil Barof- R
sky, Special Inspector General of TARP).
16 Specifically, this Article does not address the deepening of the European banking crisis
that began around 2011, as sovereign-funding concerns in some euro area countries raised
doubts about the viability of the European financial sector, because the U.S. and European
financial markets had significantly different exposures to the countries at the heart of the sov-
ereign debt crisis. See, e.g., Patrick Jenkins & Megan Murphy, Bank Contagion Fear
Resurfaces in the Eurozone, FIN. TIMES, July 12, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f3ef
cbe2-aca7-11e0-a2f3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Jxrv51K5 (observing that “European banks
account for about 90 per cent of international banking exposure to Italy”); Financial Stability
Oversight Council Annual Report to Congress: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 5 (2011) (statement of Timothy F. Geithner, U.S. Trea-
sury Secretary) (stating that “[the U.S.’] direct financial exposure to [European] governments
and their financial institutions is quite small.”).
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implemented around the world, both in response to the 2008–2009 global
financial crisis and the Asian banking crisis in the late 1990s. I compare the
CPP with alternative recapitalization strategies that other governments have
adopted, and explore the relative effectiveness of various approaches. Based
on this analysis, I propose in Part IV that a future U.S. recapitalization pro-
gram should modify six aspects of the CPP.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM
A. Characteristics of an Optimal Recapitalization
Public recapitalization of private financial institutions was a widely
adopted response to the global financial crisis. Typically, private enterprises
raise capital through voluntary market transactions. However, when finan-
cial stability erodes, as it was in 2008, access to the private markets may be
limited. With the exception of Warren Buffett’s investment in Goldman
Sachs and Mitsubishi UFJ’s investment in Morgan Stanley, the funding
available to U.S. banks in 2008 was limited to sovereign wealth funds.17
Financial institutions also faced the problem of “debt overhang,” whereby
the presence of existing debt was sufficiently large that creditors were not
confident of repayment.18 The crisis also increased the difficulty for financial
institutions with large portfolios to disclose sufficient details to overcome
the informational asymmetry vis-a`-vis investors.19 Moreover, investors
hoarded liquidity either to satisfy regulatory requirements or because they
expected fire-sale prices in the future.20
Where the social value of a moribund institution’s existence is larger
than the social cost of the government bailout, a subsidized recapitalization
may be justified. An oft-cited example is the 2008 rescue of the insurance
giant, American International Group (“AIG”). At the time, AIG’s insurance
subsidiaries owned more than eighty-one million life insurance policies with
a face value of $1.9 trillion.21 Had AIG failed, its subsidiaries would have
been seized by state regulators, leaving policyholders facing considerable
17 See TIMOTHY G. MASSAD, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTMENTS BY THE U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF THE TREASURY IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM 13–14 (2009).
18 The concept of debt overhang was first formalized in Stewart C. Myers, The Determi-
nants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977).
19 See Matisuhiro Fukao, Recapitalizing Japan’s Banks: The Functions and Problems of
Financial Revitalization Act and Bank Recapitalization Act, 38 KEIO BUS. REV. 1, 6 (2000);
Michael Lewis, What Wall Street’s CEOs Don’t Know Can Kill You, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26,
2008, 00:01), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSE8yLAyAL
NQ (“The [Wall Street firms’] complexity renders them in inherently opaque. Investors . . .
will demand to be paid for opacity.”).
20 See Douglas Diamond & Raghuram Rajan, Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and
Credit Freezes, 126 Q. J. ECON. 557, 557–58 (2011).
21 Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Case for Saving A.I.G., by A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009,
at B1.
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uncertainty about the status of their claims.22 AIG was also a significant
counterparty to a number of major financial institutions, and its failure could
have exacerbated the severe liquidity and insolvency challenges faced by the
financial sector.23 Because regulators feared that AIG’s failure would result
in an “intensification of an already severe financial crisis and a further wors-
ening of global economic conditions,” government intervention seemed both
necessary and appropriate.24
In theory, public recapitalizations have three main goals. First, the in-
tervention should stabilize the banking system and facilitate a prompt return
to normalcy. To this end, it is important that the assistance is temporary,
aimed at restructuring unhealthy banks and reverting them back to private
ownership in a timely manner. A prominent example of a failure in this
respect is the Japanese “lost decade.” In response to the collapse of its stock
and real estate market in the 1990s, the Japanese government injected ¥1.8
trillion into the banking system in 1998, followed by another ¥7.5 trillion
injection in 1999.25 Although the recapitalizations effectively stabilized the
financial markets, it failed to address the non-performing loans problem at
the center of the crisis.26 As a result, Japanese banks continued to be thinly
capitalized, resulting in a decade of marginally functioning “zombie banks”
that struggled to remain solvent.27 Five of the twenty-one recapitalized banks
have yet to fully repay the Japanese government’s investments as of February
2013.28
Second, the recapitalization should support credit supply to the private
sector. Contractions in bank credit cause a decrease in economic activity and
22 See id.
23 Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
17, 2008, at A1 (warning that if A.I.G. had collapsed, “institutional investors around the world
would have been instantly forced to reappraise the value of those securities [that AIG was
counterparty to], and that in turn would have reduced their own capital and the value of their
own debt”). It was later revealed that AIG’s financial counterparties may have in fact hedged
most of their exposure, either by shorting AIG stock or by collateral calls. Carrick Mol-
lenkamp et al., Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-World Test, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 2008, at A1. However, accurate information regarding counterparty exposure was
likely unavailable at the time the bailout decision was made.
24 Oversight of the Federal Government’s Intervention at American International Group:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at http://archives.
financialservices.house.gov/media/file/hearings/111/statement_-_bernanke032409.pdf.
25 See Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed?
Eight Lessons from Japan, 97 J. FIN. ECON. 398, 406, 409 (2010).
26 See id. at 401.
27 See id.; see also James Baker, How Washington Can Prevent ‘Zombie Banks’, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b3f299a6-0697-11de-ab0f-000077b0765
8.html#axzz2KSNnGcfg.
28 Statistics calculated from data available at Capital Injection (Including Earthquake Dis-
aster Countermeasure), DEPOSIT INS. CORP. OF JAPAN, http://www.dic.go.jp/english/e_katsu
do/e_shihonzokyo/e_jisseki-soki.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“List of Capital Injection
Operations Pursuant to the former Financial Functions Stabilization Act” and “List of Capital
Injection Operations Pursuant to the Early Strengthening Act”).
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an increase in unemployment.29 Put another way, “one bank’s decision to
forgo profitable lending . . . reduces payments to households, which in-
creases household defaults and thus worsen other banks’ [conditions].”30 By
subsidizing bank capital, recapitalizations aim to stimulate the real economy
by increasing business lending.31
Finally, the recapitalization should minimize moral hazard. Bailouts, in
general, present the omnipresent concern that excessive risk-taking will be
subsidized, and hence encouraged.32 Government rescue undermines the
market discipline of creditors and counterparties, and decreases investors’
incentives to monitor bank performance.33 Particularly with the rise of “too-
big-to-fail,” large financial institutions may now rationally decide to take
excessive risk on the expectation of a bailout.34 While moral hazard cannot
be eliminated, it can be reduced by the government’s willingness to replace
the top management as a condition to recapitalization.35 Because corporate
decisions are often shaped by the interests of senior executives, increasing
their personal costs in the event of a bailout should strengthen incentives to
engage in prudent risk management.36
B. Criticisms of the Capital Purchase Program
The Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”) symbolized for the general
public the U.S. government’s bailout of Wall Street. On October 14, 2008,
the Treasury announced that the CPP would directly invest in “healthy, via-
ble banks to promote financial stability, maintain confidence in the financial
system, and permit institutions to continue meeting the credit needs of
American consumers and businesses.”37 Over the life of the program, Trea-
sury purchased $205 billion in preferred stock and subordinated debt from
707 different financial institutions in forty-eight states, the District of Co-
29 See Sharon L. Poczter, The Long Term Effects of a Bank Bailout Program: Evidence
from an Emerging Market 2 (Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2004609.
30 Thomas Philippon & Philipp Schnabl, Efficient Recapitalization, 68 J. FIN. 1, 2 (2013).
31 Poczter, supra note 29, at 2. R
32 See Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric Talley & Ivo Welch, A Model of Optimal Corporate
Bailouts 2 (May 10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1830583; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT:
THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL 184 (2011).
33 See Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of Last Resort: A Review of the Literature, in FINAN-
CIAL CRISES, CONTAGION, AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT 27, 39 (Charles Goodhart &
Gerhard Illing eds., 2002).
34 See An Overall Assessment of TARP and Financial Stability, supra note 14, at 5. R
35 See, e.g., Bernardo et al., supra note 32, at 30; cf. An Overall Assessment of TARP and R
Financial Stability, supra note 14, at 124 (statement of Simon Johnson, Ronald Kurtz Profes- R
sor of Entrepreneurship, MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt.).
36 Cf. Bernardo et al., supra note 32, at 23 (observing that “[t]he threat of termination R
upon failure [ ] improves the incumbent’s [ex ante] incentives”).
37 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
SIG-QR-09-04, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 55 (2009).
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lumbia, and Puerto Rico.38 Treasury also received ten-year warrants equal to
approximately fifteen percent of the investment.39 As of January 31, 2013,
497 institutions, including nine with the largest CPP investments, had paid
back all or a portion of their principal for an aggregate total of $220.85
billion of repayments and income.40
It is widely agreed that the CPP has been effective in reducing the
banks’ default risk. The price of credit default swaps—a type of financial
insurance contract—and the LIBOR-OIS spread—which measures the dif-
ferences in bond yields—are commonly used as proxies for market percep-
tions of the likelihood of default: an increase in either metric reflects
heightened fears of bank insolvency while a decrease signifies improve-
ments in market confidence.41 Within three months of the CPP’s announce-
ment, the price of credit default swaps for the eight largest United States
banks declined approximately 275 basis points, and the one-month and
three-month LIBOR-OIS spreads declined about 202 and 147 basis points,
respectively.42 The fact that no major credit event took place in the United
States after the implementation of the CPP is certainly an indication of the
success of the program in stabilizing the financial system.
At the same time, the CPP has fallen short of achieving the three goals
described above. Put simply, it has no clear exit in sight, has failed to stimu-
late lending, and has created enormous moral hazard.
1. No Clear End in Sight
To avoid tilting the playing field in favor of larger institutions, the CPP
is open to any “bank, savings association, bank holding company and sav-
ings and loan holding company” organized under domestic law—not merely
systemically important institutions.43 In fact, eighty-seven percent (625) of
the 707 CPP recipients have total assets of less than $1 billion.44 The Trea-
sury invested in all recipient institutions under a “one-size-fits-all” ap-
38 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
SIG-QR-10-03, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 70 (2010).
39 Id. at 69.
40 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM (TARP): MONTHLY
REPORT TO CONGRESS – JANUARY 2013, at 7 (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/ini
tiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/January%202013%20Monthly%20Report%20to
%20Congress.pdf.
41 See generally HAL SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 890–92 (18th
ed. 2011) (providing an expansive discussion of credit default swaps); Daniel L. Thornton,
What the Libor-OIS Spread Says, ECON. SYNOPSES (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis,
Mo.), May 11, 2009, at 1, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/09/ES09
24.pdf (summary of the LIBOR-OIS spread).
42 Kashkari, supra note 4. R
43 Process-Related FAQs for Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/faqcpp.pdf (last visited Mar.
26, 2013).
44 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY OVERSIGHT REPORT: SMALL BANKS IN THE CAPITAL
PURCHASE PROGRAM 66 (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\50-2\HLL206.txt unknown Seq: 8 16-MAY-13 15:11
520 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 50
proach. Although different terms were adopted for public, private, S-
corporations, and mutual banks, the basic provisions—coupon rate, dividend
restrictions, and limits on executive compensation—were similar.45
However, smaller banks are often privately held, have limited access to
capital markets, and do not benefit from the “too big to fail” guarantee; it is
thus harder for them to meet the required dividend payments or raise suffi-
cient capital to repay the government.46 As a result, small banks have in-
creasingly become “trapped” within the CPP. According to the February 13,
2013 monthly report to Congress on TARP, approximately thirty percent
(210) of the total 707 CPP beneficiaries remain in the program.47 All of these
remaining institutions have total assets of less than $10 billion.48
The role of the government as a shareholder is expected to become
more significant as the remaining 210 institutions fall behind on required
dividend payments. Approximately 139 of the remaining institutions have
missed at least one scheduled dividend or interest payment, and 117 of these
institutions have missed six or more.49 This number will likely grow substan-
tially in 2013, as the dividend rate charged to recipients rises from five per-
cent to nine percent.50 Under the terms of the CPP, the Treasury has the right
to appoint two board members when a bank misses six dividend payments.51
On July 19, 2011, the Treasury appointed, for the first time, four board mem-
bers to two CPP banks—First Banks, Inc. and Royal Bancshares of Penn-
sylvania, Inc.52 Since then, the Treasury has elected twelve board members to
seven CPP institutions.53
2. Failure to Stimulate Lending
The CPP contains only non-binding language that the recipient institu-
tion “agrees to expand the flow of credit to the U.S. consumers and busi-
nesses on competitive terms to promote the sustained growth and vitality of
the U.S. economy.”54 The Treasury justifies this feature in the context of a
45 See id. at 12 n.21 (“Because S corporations are legally allowed to issue only one class
of equity, and it must be held by a natural person, Treasury structured subordinated debenture
transactions, which pay interest quarterly at 7.7 percent per year for the first five years . . . and
13.8 percent per year thereafter.”).
46 Id. at 3.
47 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 40, at 7. R
48 Id. at 9.
49 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CUMULATIVE DIVIDENDS, INTEREST AND DISTRIBU-
TIONS REPORT AS OF JANUARY 31, 2013 20–28 (2013).
50 MASSAD, supra note 17, at 28. R
51 Id. at 41.
52 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-301, CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM:
REVENUES HAVE EXCEEDED INVESTMENTS, BUT CONCERNS ABOUT OUTSTANDING INVEST-
MENTS REMAIN 15 (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
(TARP): MONTHLY 105(A) REPORT—JULY 2011 8 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/July%20105(a)%20Report.pdf.
53  See id. at 16.
54 MASSAD, supra note 17, at 37 (internal citations omitted). R
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top-down approach to increasing lending and unfreezing the credit markets.
By increasing the capital base of an array of healthy, viable institutions,
banks will have the capability and incentive to increase their lending if good
lending opportunities exist.55 Where there is reduced credit demand or a fail-
ure of businesses in the real economy, banks would not be forced to origi-
nate a rash of bad loans.56 This lending flexibility also enables recipients to
increase their capital buffer in response to instability in the banking system
or uncertainty regarding future changes in regulatory capital standards.
There is mounting evidence, however, that this top-down model is not
working. Data from the Federal Reserve’s opinion survey on bank lending
practices indicates that credit demand rebounded after July 2009.57 At the
same time, bank lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”)
in the United States remained sluggish. Indeed, in the first half of 2010,
fifty-nine percent of the businesses polled by the Federal Reserve applied for
credit, but only half of the small business applicants were approved.58 A
study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(“OECD”) found that the pace of small-business lending fell by over six
percentage points ($43 billion) in 2010 from 2009.59 Large lenders with over
$50 billion in assets, the majority of whom received CPP investments, had
the largest dollar volume decline, with a loss of more than $18 billion.60
Measuring the direct effect of the CPP investments on the credit supply
is difficult, particularly because the effects of the capital injection is entan-
gled with that of other policy-based and macro-economic factors at work.
For example, the total outstanding amount of loans on a bank’s balance sheet
can reflect new loans, or alternatively, the effect of businesses drawing on
their preexisting revolving credit facilities.61 Subject to these caveats, evi-
55 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 19–20 (2009); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Capital Purchase Program (Oct. 20,
2008) (“Our purpose is to increase confidence in our banks and increase the confidence of our
banks, so that they will deploy, not hoard, their capital . . . . [I]ncreased confidence will lead
to increased lending. This increased lending will benefit the U.S. economy and the American
people.”), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1223.
aspx; Bert Ely, Don’t Push Banks to Make Bad Loans, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2009, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB123353296384237547.html.
56 See Ely, supra note 55. R
57 See United States, in FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2012: AN OECD
SCOREBOARD 157, 162 (OECD ed., 2012). But data from the National Federation of Indepen-
dent Business present contradictory results, indicating that credit demand continued to decline
throughout 2009 and 2010. See id. 162–63.
58 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York Fed’s New Small Business Poll
Shows Evidence of Credit Demand; Cash Flows for Small Businesses Key to Credit Approval
(Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/regional_outreach/
2010/an101018.html.
59 United States, supra note 57, at 159. R
60 Id.
61 See TARP Oversight: Is TARP Working for Main Street? Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 7–9 (2009)
(statement of David S. Scharfstein, Professor of Fin., Harvard Bus. Sch.).
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dence from academic literature portrays a contradictory picture as to whether
that the CPP achieved the goal of stimulating lending. A Federal Reserve
Board study using panel data on gross commercial and industrial (“C&I”)
loan originations found no economically significant difference between the
loan volume of CPP recipients and non-recipients.62 Similarly, a study by
University of Michigan professors Ran Duchin and Denis Sosyura used
loan-level data on twenty-five million mortgages and twenty-eight thousand
corporate loans and concluded that the CPP investments did not stimulate
credit origination.63 As discussed in the next sub-part, both studies also
found that CPP recipients increased their risk profile—investing in riskier
asset classes and tilting their portfolios to higher-yielding securities—after
receiving government funding.64 A working paper by Lei Li using Call Re-
ports published on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s website and con-
trolling for local economic conditions, however, concludes that CPP
investments increased recipients’ credit origination by an annualized rate of
6.43 percent.65 In addition, Li found no evidence that CPP recipients made
loans of lower quality than non-recipients.66 Most recently, a 2012 report
commissioned by the U.S. Small Business Administration using the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Call Reports found that CPP recipients not only
decreased SME lending by twenty-one percent between 2008 and 2011, the
decline was dramatically greater than that observed for non-CPP participants
(fourteen percent).67
3. Creation of Moral Hazard
In the fall of 2008, the Treasury feared that the weakness of some of the
largest banks would “be a surprise to the market” and create instability.68 It
therefore designed the CPP with standardized terms to “avoid stigmatizing
any one bank as being a weak bank” or provide a negative signal about the
true value of the recipients’ assets.69 To prevent the stronger institutions from
opting out, the terms and conditions of TARP were “intentionally gener-
62 See Lamont Black & Lieu Hazelwood, The Effect of TARP on Bank Risk-Taking 16 (Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Int’l Fin. Discussion, Working Paper No. 1043, 2012),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1043/ifdp1043.pdf.
63 See Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, Safer Ratios, Riskier Portfolios: Banks’ Response to
Government Aid 2–3 (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1165, 2012), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1925710.
64 See id. at 4; Black & Hazelwood, supra note 62, at 3. R
65 See Lei Li, TARP Funds Distribution and Bank Loan Supply 2 (Aug. 10, 2012) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515349.
66 Id. at 4.
67 REBEL A. COLE, HOW DID THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECT SMALL BUSINESS LENDING IN
THE UNITED STATES? 25–26 (2012), available at http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/
rs399tot.pdf.
68 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 32, at 62. R
69 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
SIGTARP 10-001, EMERGENCY CAPITAL INJECTIONS PROVIDED TO SUPPORT THE VIABILITY OF
BANK OF AMERICA, OTHER MAJOR BANKS, AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 17 (2009), avail-
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ous.”70 The initial dividend rate was five percent, half of what Warren Buf-
fett received from a similar transaction with Goldman Sachs.71 There were
no binding lending or restructuring requirements, and dividends on ordinary
shares were allowed to continue at the last quarterly level declared.72 The
executive compensation restrictions in the original CPP terms only limited
the severance payments of the top five officials and required recipient insti-
tutions to adopt compensation schemes that do not encourage unnecessary
and excessive risk.73 Congress later placed additional limits on bonus pay-
ments to a number of top executives after four months of public outcry.74
While much of the moral hazard created by TARP was inherent in any
large-scale government recapitalization, the CPP’s use of attractive “one-
size-fits-all” terms likely exacerbated the problem in at least three ways.
First, as the Congressional Oversight Panel’s Advisory Committee on Fi-
nance and Valuation explains, the Treasury’s decision to provide capital on
uniform terms “effectively offered weaker participants greater subsidies
than it offered to stronger participants.”75 Notably, Citigroup, which had
been forced to take billions of dollars in write-downs in the run-up to the
crisis, received $25 million from the Treasury in exchange for securities val-
ued at $15.5 million.76 In contrast, Wells Fargo, widely regarded as one of
the banking industry’s healthiest players in 2008, gave approximately $23.2
million worth of securities for the same $25 million investment.77 In general,
riskier investments have greater potential gains along with a considerably
increased chance of significant losses; banks typically balance their invest-
ment portfolio to ensure a meaningful return while insulating themselves
from the potentially catastrophic losses that accompany a risky portfolio.
However, the “one-size-fits-all” distribution of capital magnifies incentives
for banks to incur excessive risk by allowing institutions to keep the large
returns from successful gambles while ensuring that losses would be borne
by the Treasury.
able at http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/Emergency_Capital_Injections_Provided_to
_Support_the_Viability_of_Bank_of_America.pdf.
70 See Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, Spring 2009, at 1, 52, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/
bpea/spring%202009/2009a_bpea_swagel.pdf (recounting that the CPP “had to be the oppo-
site of the ‘Sopranos’ or the ‘Godfather’—not an attempt to intimidate banks, but instead a deal
so attractive that banks would be unwise to refuse it”).
71 See MASSAD, supra note 17, at 24. R
72 See id. at 35, 37–41.
73 See id.; TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 31 C.F.R. § 30
(2011).
74 See 31 C.F.R. § 30.
75 Adam M. Blumenthal et al., Report to Congressional Oversight Panel on the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, in CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT
REPORT: VALUING TREASURY’S ACQUISITIONS 26, 28 (2009).
76 DUFF & PHELPS, VALUATION REPORT I-10 (2009) (valuations derived from the average
of the reported “low” and “high” estimations).
77 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\50-2\HLL206.txt unknown Seq: 12 16-MAY-13 15:11
524 Harvard Journal on Legislation [Vol. 50
Second, by failing to hold senior executives accountable for the conse-
quences of their errors, the CPP reinforced the “heads I win, tails the gov-
ernment will bail me out” incentive system. The Treasury avoided removing
the managers at the helm of even the most fundamentally troubled institu-
tions. Of the nine largest beneficiaries, only Bank of America saw an unex-
pected chief executive officer change in 2009.78 Although the Treasury
eventually placed limits on the bonus payments to top management, the re-
strictions were seen as “mild,” and were frequently not enforced.79 Moreo-
ver, Harvard professors David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein have noted
that because no explicit suspension of dividends was included, top execu-
tives and equity holders at many distressed institutions continued to receive
compensation through dividends on common stock during the crisis period.80
They estimate that the amount of dividend payments directed to officers and
directors of the nine largest CPP recipients—including Citigroup and Bank
of America—amounts to approximately $250 million in the first year of the
program.81 As the Congressional Oversight Panel for TARP points out, had
bank executives instead been forced to accept tougher executive compensa-
tion and corporate governance restrictions as a condition to the CPP, “they
would be less willing to repeat the experience, reducing moral hazard.”82
Finally, by steadfastly refusing to condition CPP funding on balance
sheet reductions, the Treasury entrenched the existence of “too big to fail.”
Banks that were “too big to fail” in 2008 have only gotten bigger; between
the end of 2007 and September 2009, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and
J.P. Morgan Chase grew by 100 percent, 35 percent, and 25 percent, respec-
tively.83 In a March 2010 speech, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
warned that large banks now face “limited market discipline, . . . [thereby]
allowing them to obtain funding on better terms than the quality or riskiness
of their business would merit and giving them incentives to take on exces-
78 Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, Bank of America Chief Resigns Under Fire, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125434715693053835.html. Richard M.
Kovacevich, the CEO of Wells Fargo, also announced his resignation in September of 2009.
Greg Farrell, Kovacevich to Step Down at Wells Fargo, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.
ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e0308b18-a7cd-11de-b0ee-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2KkEZTtjO.
79 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 3, at 178–79; see Mary Williams Walsh, U.S. Faulted R
Over Pay at Rescued Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at B4 (reporting that despite the re-
striction, “[f]orty-nine [executives] received packages worth $5 million or more from 2009 to
2011”).
80 David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, This Bailout Doesn’t Pay Dividends, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at A29. There are two reasons why the bank might be incentivized to
direct funds away from building its equity cushion. First, bank executives may believe that
maintaining dividends is necessary to “support their stock prices and to make further capital-
raising possible.” Id. This concern may be particularly prominent as non-participating banks
continued paying significant dividends. Second, equity holders—many of which are also em-
ployees of the bank—have an incentive to maintain dividend payments to prevent these funds
from being seized by creditors in the event of a bankruptcy. Id.
81 Id.
82 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 32, at 185. R
83 JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 3, at 180. R
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sive risks.”84 The Congressional Oversight Panel echoed this sentiment in
noting that the CPP has created a perverse incentive for “too big to fail”
institutions to “disregard risk, since when it comes to their all-important cost
of capital, the markets will no longer penalize them for recklessness or short-
sightedness in lending, nor will they reward responsibility or prudence.”85
As it turns out, the Treasury’s efforts to portray all recipients as
“healthy” had little effect. The market had a fairly accurate perception of
each bank’s relative health during the crisis.86 Despite participation in the
CPP by all major U.S. banks, the stock prices of Citigroup and Bank of
America were consistently at the bottom of the group and the General Coun-
sel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York told the Special Inspector
General for the TARP that “the market still perceived Citigroup as an insti-
tution ‘less strong than others.’” 87
Moreover, moral hazard is emerging as one of the CPP’s most signifi-
cant legacies. A 2009 study by the Center for Economics and Policy Re-
search showed that the advantages large banks—those with more than $100
billion—enjoy over small banks in the cost of funds have increased from
0.29 percentage points to 0.78 percentage points, translating to an annual
subsidy of $34 billion for the 18 largest U.S. banks.88 A working paper by
New York University Professor Viral V. Acharya and his co-authors simi-
larly found that, after the crisis, the price of borrowing for large financial
institutions did not reflect the institutions’ risk profile.89 Specifically, the au-
thors determined that larger intuitions have enjoyed a 100 basis point bor-
rowing cost advantage over smaller ones since 2008, despite having pursued
riskier strategies.90 Looking at the investment and lending strategies of recip-
ient banks, both the Federal Reserve Board study and the study by Duchin
and Sosyura found an increase in the risk exposure of large CPP recipients.91
Specifically, Duchin and Sosyura estimated that beneficiaries increased their
investments in risky securities, such as mortgage-backed securities and equi-
84 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the
Independent Community Bankers of America National Convention: Preserving a Central Role
for Community Banking (Mar. 20, 2010), available at http:// www.federalreserve.gov/news
events/speech/bernanke20100320a.htm.
85 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 5, at 97–99. R
86 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 32, at 59–60. R
87 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
SIGTARP 11-002, EXTRAORDINARY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO CITIGROUP, INC. 8
(2011).
88 Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy,
ISSUE BRIEF (Ctr. For Econ. & Policy Res., D.C.), Sept. 2009, at 2.
89 Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Im-
plicit State Guarantees 11–12 (Jan. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961656 (“For institutions that achieve systemi-
cally-important status, spreads are less sensitive to risk.”).
90 Id. at 11–12, 37.
91 See Black & Hazelwood, supra note 62, at 3; Duchin & Sosyura, supra note 63, at 3. R
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ties acquired to profit from short-term price movements, by ten percent,
moving away from safer assets such as Treasury bonds.92
III. AN ANALYSIS OF COMPARATIVE RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAMS
As mentioned earlier, other countries have adopted a variety of differ-
ent approaches to recapitalizing their respective banking sectors. Since many
of these alternative strategies were announced and implemented around the
same time as the CPP, this section contrasts them to the CPP framework and
explores the merits of the alternative measures with reference to the recapi-
talization goals described in Part II: prompt return to normalcy, expansion of
credit supply to the private sector, and limitation of moral hazard.
A. A Snapshot of Government Responses
Figure 1 illustrates the international bailout efforts from 2008–2009.
Before October 2008, state interventions were generally ad hoc support for
individual institutions, including AIG, the Icelandic banks, Fortis, and
Dexia.93 As the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers reverberated around the
world, many countries introduced comprehensive recapitalization and guar-
antee packages passed by the legislative bodies, including the U.S. TARP.94
The rollout of these programs slowed towards the end of 2008 as govern-
ments turned once more to standalone actions, but increased again at the
beginning of 2009.95 Unlike the first set of comprehensive schemes, the 2009
packages focused more on removing troubled legacy assets.96 By the end of
2009, several large banks had fully or partially repaid the government sup-
port, including all of the large U.S. and French beneficiaries.97
Table 1 provides a snapshot of the recapitalization measures undertaken
by each country. Four aspects of the U.S. CPP program immediately stand
out. First, although the CPP, often described as a “big bazooka,” is the larg-
est in absolute commitments and outlays, it is relatively small when scaled
by the size of GDP.98 Instead, the Netherlands has the largest exposure, with
recapitalization commitments of around 4.1 percent of GDP. While this
measure of the magnitude of state aid is imperfect because it does not take
92 Duchin & Sosyura, supra note 63, at 3. R
93 See Fabio Panetta et al., An Assessment of Financial Sector Rescue Programmes, BIS
PAPERS (Bank of Int’l Settlements, Basel, Switz.), July 2009, at 7.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 9.
96 See id.
97 See id.; see also AGENCE DES PARTICIPATIONS DE L‘E´TAT, FRENCH STATE AS A SHARE-
HOLDER 15 (2010), available at http://www.ape.minefi.gouv.fr/sections/rapports_sur_l_etat/
annual_reports_on_go/downloadFile/attachedFile_3/2010_Report_on_the_Government_as_a_
shareholder.pdf?nocache=1298909773.82.
98 See, e.g., Gillian Tett, America’s Six Key Lessons for a ‘Euro Tarp’, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a8aaeb0-f034-11e0-977b-00144feab49a.html#axzz2P9
qogGpN.
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into account companion aid through liquidity support, debt guarantees, and
asset purchases, scholars that have considered aid programs in the aggregate
have portrayed a similar story.99
Second, the CPP has the largest number of beneficiaries, over twenty
times as many as the second largest program (the 1999 Japanese Early
Strengthening Act). This is because, as noted above, the CPP is open to any
U.S. financial institution, not merely systemically important ones.100 The
only other program in this analysis available to all financial institutions re-
gardless of size is the Dutch recapitalization scheme, but regulators limited
the scope of the program by approving only three applications from mid-size
to large banks.101
The CPP’s participation rate appears lower when measured as a percent-
age of total assets in the banking system. Under this metric, the French So-
cie´te´ de Prise de Participations de L’E´tat (“SPPE”) is by far the most
significant intervention, with banks holding approximately 92.6 percent of
the total banking assets participating in the program. France is followed by
the United States, Ireland, and the Netherlands, with banks holding 75.8 per-
cent, 74.2 percent, and 65.9 percent, respectively, of the total banking assets
receiving public aid. The high participation rate in the United States and
France is almost certainly driven by the political pressure both governments
placed on systematically important banks to partake in the program;102 by
contrast, large banks in Germany (Deutsche Bank) and the U.K. (Barclays
PLC) were given the option to opt out. The magnitude of the French inter-
vention, as a percentage of total banking assets, is also likely influenced by
its highly consolidated banking system.103
Third, the CPP appears significantly cheaper than its international coun-
terparts. While renumerations for other Western investments range from
eight to twelve percent, the dividend rate for the CPP preferred shares is a
fixed five percent, with a step-up to incentivize the beneficiaries to exit as
soon as normal market conditions resume. Moreover, as described in Part
II.B.3, the CPP provided additional subsidies to weaker participants through
its use of standardized coupon rates, which make no reference to the sound-
99 See, e.g., Panetta, supra note 93, at 11–12 (noting that the U.K. and the Netherlands R
“stand out in terms of exposure, with overall commitments hovering around 50% of GDP”).
100 MASSAD, supra note 17, at 6. R
101 See Press Release, De Nederlandsche Bank, Measure by the Dutch Authorities to Pro-
tect the Financial Sector (Oct. 9, 2008), available at http://www.dnb.nl/en/news/news-and-
archive/persberichten-2008/dnb189083.jsp; Interview by Michael Steen with Wouter Bos,
State Sec’y, Neth. Ministry of Fin. (Feb. 3, 2009), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
14fea478-f212-11dd-9678-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2P9qogGpN (describing support by the
Dutch government for ING, Aegon, and SNS Reaal).
102 See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PRO-
GRAM, supra note 69, at 18; Pierre-Henri Conac, Mastering the Financial Crisis—The French R
Approach, 2 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 297, 312 (2010).
103 See generally Yingbin Xiao, French Banks Amid the Global Financial Crisis 3 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 09/201, 2009) (stating that the nine largest French banks
account for seventy-five percent of total French banking assets).
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ness of the recipient in the form of risk and profit-linked parameters. Only
two other programs—the U.K. GRS and the Irish recapitalization scheme—
use standardized forms.
Several commentators have suggested that the CPP’s low dividend rate
is misleading because it ignores the value of the warrants—financial instru-
ments that allowed the holder to gain from potential stock price increases—
that the Treasury simultaneously acquired.104 However, the instruments used
in the German, Irish, and Dutch recapitalization schemes also include war-
rants and convertibility options that carry additional value. The Irish recapi-
talization, in particular, is directly comparable to the CPP as it similarly
issued ten-year warrants in combination with nonconvertible preferred stock.
Moreover, the CPP warrants have had limited dilutive impact in practice, as
they have generally been repurchased by the issuing banks—either at a ne-
gotiated fair market price or through a public auction—upon exit from the
program.105
Finally, the CPP contains relatively lenient non-price conditions; for
example, it does not require participating banks to maintain a target level of
lending and it places few limits on executive compensation. For comparison,
Table 2 summarizes the non-price conditions of the comparative recapitali-
zation programs. In addition, the European Commission (“Commission”)
has conditioned its approval of the capital assistance to Commerzbank, UBS,
ING Groep (“ING”), Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”), and Lloyds-HBOS
on business-model restructurings and balance sheet reductions—by as much
as forty-five percent in the case of ING and Commerzbank.106 The Commis-
sion also subjected Commerzbank and ING to a price leadership prohibition,
preventing them from offering their products and services at the most
favorable terms on the market for several years.107
Two features found in the other recapitalization programs are also dis-
tinctive. First, only the U.K. injected common shares in the first recapitaliza-
tion tranche (the second tranche in Commerzbank, for example, was also in
ordinary shares). This was not intentional. As part of the GRS, U.K.’s Her
104 Cf. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, FEBRUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: VALUING TREASURY’S
ACQUISITIONS 34 (2009) (recognizing that “warrants have a value independent of the preferred
shares themselves”). See generally MASSAD, supra note 17, at 5 n.3, 34, for an explanation of R
warrants.
105 Some institutions such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have directly repur-
chased the warrants from the Treasury at a negotiated price. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note
41, at 432–38. Other institutions including Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan Chase have elected to R
have the Treasury conduct an open public auction of the warrants but have reportedly bid on
their own warrants to pick up slack. See id. Wells Fargo, for example, purchased sixty-four
percent of its own warrants at the open auction. See David Henry, Wells Fargo Bailout War-
rants Sell for $849 Million as Bank Bids in Auction, BLOOMBERG (May 21, 2010), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-21/wells-fargo-warrants-said-to-fetch-849-million-in-auction-
to-repay-tarp.html.
106 CTR. EUR. POLICY STUDIES, BANK STATE AID IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: FRAGMENTA-
TION OR LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 16–17 (2010) (describing the non-price conditions imposed for
ING, Commerzbank, Lloyds-HBOS, and RBS).
107 Id.
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF NON-PRICE CONDITIONS FOR
COMPARATIVE PROGRAMS
U.K. (GRS)
• Prohibits all common stock dividends without regulator consent for as long as the pre-
ferred shares were outstanding.
• Prohibits bonuses for 2008 and requires “any severance package for a dismissed direc-
tor be reasonable and perceived as fair.”
• Requirement to restore and maintain mortgage lending to SMEs at the 2007 level and
to provide reports on their lending activity.
Germany (SoFFin)
• Limitations on common stock dividends (temporary ban on dividends for first tranche
in Commerzbank).
• Caps compensation to senior executives at C=500,000 a year without bonus.
• Requirement to increase in loans available to SMEs (C=2.5 billion for Commerzbank).
France (SPPE)
• Prohibits bonuses and severance payments where there are “large-scale lay-offs”
• Prohibits stock options and free shares to senior executives, and limits authorization of
bonuses to one year.
• Requirement to maintain a three to four percent annual growth rate in overall lending
level and to provided monthly reports.
Ireland
• Requires a 25%–33% reduction in compensation for senior executives, 25% for non-
executive directors, and bans both bonuses and salary increases in 2008 and 2009.
• Requires increase lending to SMEs and first time buyers by 10% and 30% respectively.
• Commitment not to commence foreclosure proceedings for principle private residences
for twelve months after arrears appearing.
• Requirement to establish a C=100 million environment and clean energy innovation
fund.
• Requirement to provide C=15 million to new seed capital fund with Enterprise Ireland.
Netherlands
• Prohibits bonuses for 2008, and limits severance payments to one year’s fixed salary.
Japan (1999 Early Strengthening Act)
• Requirement to increase lending to SMEs (unspecified goal which varied by individual
restructuring plans).
U.S. (TIP)
• Prohibits all common stock dividends in excess of $0.01 per share per without the
consent for as long as the preferred shares were outstanding.
• Prohibits severance payments and bonuses to executive, and requires a portion of 2008
bonuses be payable as deferred stock or cash awards and a portion be subject to per-
formance based vesting.
• Requirement to provide quarterly reports on use of purchase price.
U.S. (SSFI)
• Prohibits increase in common stock dividends for five years (AIG had eliminated ordi-
nary dividends at the time of the transaction).
• Prohibits severance payments to Senior Partners (approximately top seventy officials),
and limits annual bonus pools of Senior Partners to 2006 and 2007 levels.
• Prohibits use of purchase price for executive compensation.
Source: Data used in compiling the information in this table is derived from a variety of sources. For further
information, a separate listing of the sources used is available online at the Journal on Legislation website at http://
www.harvardjol.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/sourcesPDF.pdf
Majesty’s (“HM”) Treasury had pledged to purchase up to £25 billion of
preference or ordinary shares in the event that the banks did not raise suffi-
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cient capital from existing shareholders.108 When existing shareholders pur-
chased less than one percent of the total shares offered to them, the
government was forced to invest about £15 billion in ordinary shares of RBS
(a 57.9 percent stake) and £13 billion in that of Lloyds TSB-HBOS (a 43.4
percent stake).109
Second, in the 1999 Early Strengthening Act, Japan uniquely recapital-
ized each beneficiary with multiple instruments that contain varying terms
and non-price conditions.110 Critics of the Japanese program have speculated
that the unusual complexity of the recapitalization was an effort by the Japa-
nese Financial Revitalization Commission (“FRC”) to obscure the cost of
the government assistance.111 Indeed, the Japanese Ministry of Finance
(“MOF”) gave repeated public assurances throughout the mid-1990s that no
public assistance would be needed to rescue the banking sector.112 When the
MOF ultimately pledged ¥680 billion to resolve the problem of failing hous-
ing loan companies known as jusen, a public outcry ensued.113 Recognizing
that a large rescue package was necessary, the Japanese government may
have purposefully designed a recapitalization scheme that was difficult to
value in order to deflect the intense public criticism that would likely come
their way.
B. Effectiveness in Achieving Recapitalization Goals
1. Return to Normalcy
Initial empirical evidence suggests that the European recapitalization
programs have been successful in reducing banks’ default risk. According to
a 2009 event study by Banca D’Italia, the announcement of the recapitaliza-
tion programs reduced the price of credit default swaps (the “CDS pre-
mium”) for European banks by about sixty basis points in the three days
surrounding the announcement.114 The CDS premium on all of the European
banks remained steady until the early part of 2009, in contrast to the volatil-
108 Press Release, HM Treasury, Financial Support to the Banking Industry (Oct. 8, 2008),
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press
_100_08.htm.
109 See Government to Own Majority of RBS, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2008), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7753845.stm; Simon Kennedy, U.K. Government to Take 43.4% in Com-
bined Lloyds, HBOS Group, WALL ST. J. MARKETWATCH (Jan. 29, 2009), http://articles.
marketwatch.com/2009-01-12/news/30830265_1_hbos-group-lloyds-tsb-uk.
110 See Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 25, at 408–09 (noting that “[m]ost banks sold mul- R
tiple instruments to the government”).
111 See id. (“The use of multiple securities with various terms [ ]obscured the cost of the
bailout.”). See also Heather Montgomery & Satoshi Shimizutani, The Effectiveness of Bank
Recapitalization Policies in Japan, 21 JAPAN WORLD ECON. 1, 5 n.10 (2009) (noting that the
FRC was established in 1998 under the Prime Minister’s Office to oversee the bank recapitali-
zation and restructuring; the Commission closed on January 6, 2001).
112 See Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 25, at 400. R
113 See id.
114 See Panetta, supra note 93, at 33. R
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ity of the CDS premium on U.S. banks during that time.115 A 2009 Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (“IMF”) report similarly found that by the end of June
2009, LIBOR-OIS spreads of Euro area countries, on average, declined sev-
enty-five percent from their respective crisis peaks.116
The pace of exit from the European comparative recapitalizations dif-
fers substantially across countries. By March of 2011, all six French banks
that received public funds had reimbursed the SPPE.117 Beneficiaries of two
of the remaining comparative recapitalizations, SoFFin and the Dutch recap-
italization program, have partially repaid the state, with approximately sixty-
seven percent and twenty-eight percent, respectively, outstanding to date.118
However, the largest beneficiaries in both countries, Commerzbank and
ING, have stalled repayment since 2012 in light of the ongoing Eurozone
crisis and increased regulatory capital requirements.119 Funding provided
through the remaining two recapitalization vehicles, the GRS and the Irish
recapitalization program, is expected to become long-term investments.120
115 See id.
116 INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 134 (2009), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2009/02/pdf/chap3.pdf.
117 See AGENCE DES PARTICIPATIONS DE L‘E´TAT, supra note 97, at 15 (describing the reim- R
bursements of four of the six beneficiary banks in October and November of 2009 (Cre´dit
Mutuel, Oct. 1, 2009; Cre´dit Agricole, Oct. 27, 2009; BNP Paribas Nov. 3, 2009; Socie´te´
Generale, Nov. 4, 2009)); MOODY’S INVESTOR SERV., BPCE COMPANY PROFILE 1 (2011) (on
file with author) (BPCE, the bank that emerged from the Caissed’E´pargne and Banque Popu-
laire, fully reimbursed SPPE by the end of March 2011).
118 See supra Table 1; see also Eyk Henning, Laura Stevens, & William Boston, Tightrope
for Commerzbank, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52970204844504577098704190606474.html (“This summer, the bank raised capital and was
able to pay back about C=11.5 billion [out of C=18 billion] to the German government, which
retains a 25% stake.”); Transactions with Dutch States, ING, http://www.ing.com/Our-Com
pany/Investor-relations/Transactions-with-Dutch-State.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2012); Greg
Roumeliotis, UPDATE 2-Insurer Aegon Finishes Repaying Dutch State Aid, REUTERS, June 15,
2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/15/aegon-idUSLDE75E09Z201106
15.
119 See, e.g. UPDATE 2-ING Cuts Target, No Dividend Until Aid Repaid, REUTERS, Jan.
13, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/ing-idUSL6E8CD08X2012
0113 (quoting an ING representative saying “[i]deally we would like to complete the state
repayment this year, however given the ongoing crisis in the euro zone and increasing regula-
tory capital requirements, we need to take a cautious approach and maintain strong capital
ratios in the Bank”); cf. Commerzbank Shares Fall on Nationalisation Report, BBC NEWS
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16029418 (reporting that the German
government may increase its stake in Commerzbank in 2012 if the bank cannot raise the neces-
sary capital to meet the most recent European stress test results). On March 13, 2013, Com-
merzbank announced its plans—subject to shareholder approval—to raise C=2.5 billion in new
capital to repay SoFFin a portion of the outstanding state aid. See Ulrike Dauer, Commerzbank
Moves to Repay More State Aid, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324077704578358043760853724.html.
120 See, e.g., Louise McBride, Irish Banks Could Take 20 More Years to Pay Debts, IRISH
INDEP., Apr. 3, 2011, http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/irish-banks-could-take-20-more
-years-to-pay-debts-2607469.html; Jill Treanor, UKFI Has to Stay to Deliver Fair Returns on
Taxpayers’ Investment, GUARDIAN BUS. BLOG (Nov. 28, 2011, 3:33 PM), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/business/blog/2011/nov/28/ukfi-fair-returns-taxpayer-investment.
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The divergent exit experiences of banks in the European comparative
recapitalizations provide two important insights. First, the use of risk-based
recapitalization terms do not significantly affect market perceptions of
weaker institutions or prevent their successful exit.121 BNP Paribas and So-
cie´te´ Ge´ne´rale paid interest rates of 7.75 and 8.18 percent, respectively.122
Figure 2 shows the stock prices of the two banks between September 2008
and December 2009. The share prices for both banks dipped in the fall of
2008, but recovered to approximately seventy-five percent of their peak
2008 value by December of 2009. The price movements suggest that the
market did not view the different SPPE-calculated interest rates as a negative
signal about the true value of assets in place or draw any other inference of
unexpected weakness. And despite the different coupon rates, both BNP
Paribas and Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale were able to raise the private capital necessary
to reimburse the SPPE in early November of 2009.123
Second, the lack of participation by any major bank may obstruct the
ability of participating banks to access private capital. In theory, concerns
about the expected future government interference in the beneficiaries’ af-
fairs may negatively affect investors’ perceptions of the recipients’ long-run
profitability, causing a depression of stock prices.124 Put another way, when a
major bank can opt-out, there is a signaling effect associated with the partici-
pation decision that, in turn, affects recipients’ ability to raise private capital.
Figure 3 shows the stock prices of five of the largest European recapitaliza-
tion recipients. While all of the five banks clearly saw dipping stock prices
in the fall of 2008, the three banks participating in recapitalization programs
in which a major competitor was allowed to opt-out of state aid—namely,
RBS and Lloyds (nonparticipant: Barclays PLC), and Commerzbank
(nonparticipant: Deutsche Bank)—diverged significantly from the others in
2009, and consistently tracked the bottom of the group. The probative value
of this analysis, however, is limited as the divergence may simply reflect the
comparatively healthier conditions of the French banks.
121 The deeply subordinated debt (“TSS securities”) originally subscribed by the SPPE
had a fixed initial rate calculated using the following risk-based formula: the five-year BTAN
+ 300 bps + 5 x CDS (senior five years). Decision (EC) N 613/2008 of Aug. 12, 2008 (C
8278) 7.
122 COUR DES COMPTES, LES CONCOURS PUBLICS AUX E´TABLISSEMENTS DE CRE´DIT: BILAN
ET ENSEIGNEMENTS A` TIRER 98 (2010), available at http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CC/documents/
RPT/Rapport-concours-publics-etablissements-de-credit-mai2010.pdf.
123 See AGENCE DES PARTICIPATIONS DE L‘E´TAT, FRENCH STATE AS A SHAREHOLDER,
supra note 97, at 15. R
124 See Panetta et al., supra note 93, at 2 (suggesting that “concerns about national govern- R
ments becoming important stakeholders” depressed stock prices); see generally Jenny Corbett
& Janet Mitchell, Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of Reputation, 32 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 474 (2000) (discussing importance of reputation and market perception in
a bank’s decision to participate in a government intervention).
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FIGURE 2: SHARE PRICES OF BNP PARIBAS AND SOCIE´TE´ GE´NE´RALE
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Source. See Bloomberg LP, accessed Nov. 9, 2012.
FIGURE 3: SHARE PRICES OF LARGEST RECAPITALIZED EUROPEAN BANKS
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2. Restoring Lending to the Economy
Lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) in European
countries declined significantly in the fourth quarter of 2008, prompting all
but the Netherlands to include lending requirements as a non-financial con-
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dition of the public investment.125 It is unclear, however, whether these lend-
ing mandates have impacted the supply of small business loans. According
to the European Commission’s Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs,
small business lending increased by 2.4 percent in France between 2008 and
2010, but decreased by 1.2 percent, 13.4 percent, and 27.7 percent in Ger-
many, the U.K., and Ireland, respectively.126 SME credit availability in the
Netherlands, the only country that did not impose a lending target, grew by
5.4 percent during the same period.127
There are also indications that lending mandates have spurred some
amount of imprudent lending activity. As illustrated by the Japanese experi-
ence during its “lost decade,” politically-driven lending requirements may
force recipient banks to lend to failing SMEs, which in turn may cause a
surge in non-performing loans.128 Figure 4 shows the asset quality of the loan
portfolios in Europe and the United States. Between 2009 and 2011, the
percentage of non-performing loans increased in the four countries that con-
ditioned recapitalization funds on a lending commitment—U.K., France,
Germany, and Ireland—but decreased in the two countries—the United
States and the Netherlands—that did not impose a lending target. Ireland
shows the most extreme movement, with the percentage of non-performing
FIGURE 4: BANK NPLS TO TOTAL GROSS LOANS (%)
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125 See supra Table 1. The Dutch recapitalization program required the proceeds to be
“used to strengthen equity of Issuer and its subsidiaries,” and required DNB approval for the
use of proceeds towards non-EU subsidiaries in excess of C=300 million. ING GROEP N.V.,
CORE TIER I SECURITIES RANKING PARI PASSU WITH ORDINARY SHARES (2008).
126 See Access to Finance: Loans, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
finance/data/enterprise-finance-index/access-to-finance-indicators/loans/index_en.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2013).
127 See id.
128 See Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 25, at 413. See generally SCOTT & GELPERN, supra R
note 41, at 432–38, for a background on the Japanese “lost decade.” R
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loans increasing from 2.6 percent in 2008 to 9 percent in 2009, holding rela-
tively steady thereafter.129 It is, however, inappropriate to conclude that the
lending targets associated with the recapitalizations exacerbated the problem
of non-performing loans. In order to provide a more accurate assessment of
the effect of lending requirements on non-performing loans, it will be neces-
sary to control for the underlying economic conditions and the performance
of the real economy.
More generally, it appears that favorable macroeconomic conditions
and adoption of direct lending policies played a greater role than lending
mandates in improving SME credit availability. In fact, no reports that have
considered SMEs’ post-crisis access to credit in the comparative countries
have cited the success or failure of lending targets as a significant causal
factor. For example, a study by the OECD pointed to a supplemental C=10
billion recapitalization of OSEO Garantie, a public body which finances and
supports SMEs, as “the most significant measure by far” in contributing to
the increased credit access in France.130 The OSEO guaranteed loans to
SMEs and provided direct funding, allowing more than 73,000 enterprises to
obtain C=11.5 billion in financing in 2010.131 The OECD study also noted the
contribution of the French Credit Mediation Program, which boasts an im-
pressive sixty-three percent success rate in assisting businesses that had been
refused loans.132
A 2011 report by Deutsche Bundesbank, on the other hand, cited the
sharp decline in demand for SME financing as an explanation for Germany’s
muted lending growth between 2009 and 2010.133 In fact, according to the
European Central Bank’s demand-side survey on SME credit conditions, the
loan approval rates in Germany increased from fifty-nine percent in the sec-
ond half of 2009 to seventy-nine percent in the second half of 2010.134 The
Deutsche Bundesbank also suggested that the restructuring conditions im-
posed by the European Commission on SoFFin participants reduced the
lending growth of Landesbanken, German state-owned lenders, by 1.4 per-
cent between October 2009 and September 2011.135 In contrast, German sav-
ings and cooperative banks, which were not required to shrink their balance
sheets, grew their lending activity during this time.136
129 Data: Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total Gross Loans (%), WORLD BANK, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
130 See France, in FINANCING SMES AND ENTREPRENEURS 2012, supra note 57, at 74, 78. R
131 See id.
132 See id. at 79.
133  DEUTCHE BUNDESBANK, German Banks’ Lending to the Domestic Private Sector Since
Summer 2009, in MONTHLY REPORT SEPTEMBER 2011 59, 59 (2011), available at http://www.
bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/mba/2011/201109mba_en_banks.pdf.
134 EUR. CENT. BANK, SURVEY ON THE ACCESS TO FINANCE OF SMES IN THE EURO AREA
11 (2011), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/accesstofinancesmallmediumsized
enterprises201104en.pdf?15013f9c619bd37797859435dceeeb73.
135 DEUTCHE BUNDESBANK, supra note 133, at 63. R
136 Id.
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3. Limiting Moral Hazard
The degree to which moral hazard has entered the financial system as a
result of the comparative recapitalization programs has not been rigorously
studied. Nevertheless, two imperfect metrics can provide a sketch of the
“moral hazard effect” introduced by recent government bailouts. Because of
the difficulty of disentangling the effects of contemporaneous debt guaran-
tees and monetary policy initiatives, these assessments can only capture the
effects of all crisis-period government interventions.
Reducing incentives for risk-taking is often mentioned as a possible
measure of the effectiveness of moral hazard mitigation.137 Every European
country except France took significant steps toward this end. The U.K. pro-
hibited all common stock dividends without the consent of the respective
financial regulator for as long as the preferred shares are outstanding, and
Germany’s SoFFin prohibited Commerzbank from paying dividends in 2009
and 2010.138 The U.K., Irish, and Dutch recapitalizations were also closely
tied to the resignation of senior executives at several of the beneficiary insti-
tutions.139 For example, the resignation of RBS’s chairman and chief execu-
tive officer (“CEO”) was announced the same day as the U.K. rescue
plan.140 The 1999 Japanese recapitalization terms similarly allowed the FSA
to force the resignation of a senior executive if a recipient’s actual return on
equity was below target;141 the FSA has used this authority to request the
resignation of the CEOs of UFJ Holdings, UFJ Bank, and UFJ Trust in
2004.142
The French government justifies its lenient recapitalization terms by
noting that the French banking sector was significantly less impacted by the
137 Cf. Bernardo et al., supra note 32, at 4–5. R
138 MASSAD, supra note 17, at 33; Press Release, Commerzbank, Commerzbank strength- R
ens core capital and competitiveness (Nov. 3, 2008), available at https://www.commerzbank.
com/en/hauptnavigation/presse/pressemitteilungen/archiv1/2008/quartal_08_04/presse_archiv
_detail_08_04_4722.html.
139 See Eamon Quinn, Bad Bank Triggers a String of Executive Goodbyes, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/88fb8afe-860e-11de-98de-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz1t3j3H9RZ; Jonathan Russell & Edmund Conway, RBS Chief Sir Fred Goodwin Quits as
UK Steps in to Rescue Bank, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
newsbysector/banksandfinance/3187414/Fred-Goodwin-to-go-in-banking-bail-out.html; Mar-
tijn van der Starre & Jurjen van de Pol, ING Cuts Jobs, Replaces Chief Executive, After Loss
(Update2), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news
archive&refer=home&sid=aMCzmubUgSkc.
140 See Russell & Conway, supra note 139. R
141 Cf. Kazuki Onji et al., Capital injection, restructuring targets and personnel manage-
ment; The case of Japanese regional banks, 26 J. OF THE JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 495, 500
(2012) (“In the case of unsatisfactory performance, the [Japanese] government considers in-
voking a business-improvement order, under which a bank may be prohibited or restrained
from paying dividends and executive bonuses or, in the worse [sic] case, closed down.”).
142 See Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 25, at 403. R
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financial crisis than its European counterparts.143 According to the French
Central Bank, asset write-downs linked to subprime assets represented only
sixteen percent of the Tier 1 capital base for French banks in 2009, as com-
pared to thirty-three percent in Germany and the U.K.144 Where acute weak-
ness was subsequently revealed, as was the case with the new BPCE Group,
the French government imposed harsher additional requirements. For exam-
ple, in 2009, the French state appointed two government representatives to
BPCE’s board of directors.145
Another measure for assessing the impact of government interventions
on moral hazard is the changes to the competitive landscape of the financial
sector.146 Moral hazard is more likely to exist in a highly concentrated finan-
cial sector, in which a small number of conglomerates control the bulk of
total banking assets and thus enjoy an implicit “too-big-to-fail” safety net.
The European Commission required recapitalized institutions to make exten-
sive divestures—up to as much as forty-five percent of their balance
sheets—to ensure a level playing field for small, less complex institutions.147
Nevertheless, the competitive landscape of the financial system has changed
little. The aggregate assets of the top thirty European banks experienced only
a six percent decline between 2007 and 2009, with significant drops in some
state aid recipients, such as RBS (-26 percent), and significant growth in
others, most notably BNP Paribas (+21 percent).148 The forced divestitures
also appeared to have a muted, if not adverse, effect on the implicit subsidies
for institutions perceived as “too-big-to-fail.” A 2012 IMF Working Paper
estimates that, between 2007 and 2009, the average implicit subsidy for
large banks rose by 1.6 percent and 2.84 percent in Germany and the U.K.,
respectively—where the recapitalized institutions were forced to make sig-
nificant divestitures—but decreased by 1.4 percent in France, where no re-
structuring was mandated as a condition to state aid.149
143 See COUR DES COMPTES, LES CONCOURS PUBLICS AUX E´TABLISSEMENTS DE CRE´DIT:
PREMIERS CONSTATS, PREMIE`RES RECOMMANDATIONS 86 (2009), available at http://www.
ccomptes.fr/fr/CC/documents/RPT/Rapport-concours-publics-etablissements-credits.pdf
144  Id.
145 See AGENCE DES PARTICIPATIONS DE L‘E´TAT, supra note 97, at 24. R
146 See, e.g., Stijn Claessens et al., Crisis Management and Resolution: Early Lessons
from the Financial Crisis 20 (Int’l Monetary Fund Staff Discussion, Note 11/05, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1105.pdf.
147 CTR. EUR. POLICY STUDIES, supra note 106, at 16–17. R
148 Dirk Schoenmaker, The European Banking Landscape after the Crisis 9 (Duisenberg
Sch. Of Fin., Policy Paper No. 12, 2011), available at http://www.dsf.nl/assets/cms/File/Re
search/DSF%20policy%20Paper%20No%2012%20The%20European%20Banking%20Land
scape%20after%20the%20Crisis%20April%202011.pdf.
149 Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder de Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 14 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/
128, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf.
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IV. SIX LESSONS FOR A FUTURE CPP
The Japanese and European experiences with alternative recapitaliza-
tion vehicles provide a number of useful insights for an effective recapitali-
zation design. The cross-country comparisons are admittedly imperfect;
differences in the structure of the financial industry and the political environ-
ment, among other things, will likely influence the success of the recapitali-
zation. Importantly, some of the European countries were in much stronger
positions than others at the onset of the crisis because of their limited expo-
sure to subprime assets.150 Despite these limitations, this Part offers six les-
sons for a future CPP.
A. Importance of Differentiating Recipients by Risk
The Treasury feared that structuring the CPP investments with risk-
based terms and revealing the fragility of major U.S. banks would create a
market panic. This fear was undermined by subsequent domestic and inter-
national events. The stock prices of the nine largest CPP recipients diverged
following the “one-size-fits-all” infusion,151 while the stock prices of the
major French banks moved in tandem despite having received SPPE invest-
ments on different financial terms.152 Had Treasury instead calibrated the fi-
nancial and non-financial terms of each CPP investment to the risk-profile of
the recipient, it would have captured two significant advantages.
First, the Treasury would have been better able to protect the taxpayers’
interests by obtaining appropriate compensation for the risk borne. Second,
and more importantly, the Treasury would have been able to limit moral
hazard by imposing harsher non-price conditions on weaker institutions, in-
cluding restrictions on dividends, removal of senior executives, and restruc-
turing requirements. Appropriately differentiating beneficiary banks based
on risk could have limited the creation of risk-taking incentives by penaliz-
ing poorly performing banks, such as Citigroup and Bank of America, for
their failure to lend responsibly.
150 See, e.g., Elisa Parisi-Capone, Editor Pick–European Bank Exposure to Subprime Risk,
ECONOMONITOR (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.economonitor.com/analysts/2007/09/05/editor-
pick-european-bank-exposure-to-subprime-risk (noting that “[n]one of the German banks has
significant retail operations in the US,” thereby reducing their exposure to U.S. subprime risk,
and that “the risks effectively born by French banks due to their exposure to the US subprime
market are small and are largely mitigated by these banks’ large equity base, sound business
diversification and strong deposit base”); Xiao, supra note 103, at 14 (“The market perception R
of credit risk of French banks seems to be more favorable than that of their European peers”).
151 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
152 See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
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B. Condition Recapitalization on Adequate Non-Price Commitments
The scope of non-price commitments in the U.S. recapitalization pro-
grams was inadequate. Even the Targeted Investment Program, a subsequent
TARP recapitalization program intended for weak systemically-important fi-
nancial institutions, contained no restructuring requirements and little pun-
ishment for incumbent executives.153 As a result, the U.S. recapitalization
schemes exacerbated the moral-hazard effects by generating distorted incen-
tives for senior executives and by allowing large, complex financial institu-
tions to retain “the complexity that virtually assures them access to the
safety net.”154 Indeed, Bank of America has grown by 17 percent since early
2009, while Citigroup has only experienced a modest 3 percent decline in
total assets.155 A future CPP should consider the various non-price conditions
imposed by the comparative recapitalization schemes, particularly balance
sheet reduction, temporary limitations on acquisition activity, and the elimi-
nation of incumbent senior executives. As suggested in Part IV.A, the extent
of behavioral safeguards should be calibrated to the risk profile of the bene-
ficiary bank.
C. Prevent Opt-Outs by Large Institutions
Allowing major institutions to opt-out of the recapitalization program
can prolong the length of the investment. As seen from the German and U.K.
experiences, the failure to include all large, systemically important institu-
tions in the recapitalization scheme substantially obstructs participating
banks’ ability to access private capital.156 Besides the negative signal associ-
ated with the request for state aid, private investors could also be reluctant to
invest in participating banks for fear that the government would intervene in
the institution’s business decisions in a political, rather than profit-oriented,
manner. By requiring all systemically important banks to accept government
assistance, participating institutions will thus be less likely to suffer adverse
market consequences.
153 See MASSAD, supra note 17, at 10–11, 14–15 (describing the terms of the Targeted R
Investment Program (“TIP”)’s capital injections into Bank of America and Citigroup); see also
supra Table 2 (summarizing the non-price conditions of the comparative recapitalization
programs).
154 Richard J. Herring, Wind-Down Plans as an Alternative to Bailouts: The Cross-Border
Challenges, in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS AS WE KNOW THEM 125, 139 (John B. Taylor
ed., 2010); accord Has Dodd-Frank Ended Too Big to Fail?, supra note 4, at 18 (“TARP’s R
most significant legacy may be the exacerbation of the problems posed by ‘too big to fail,’
particularly given the manner in which Treasury executed the bailout.”); Oliver Hart & Luigi
Zingales, Curbing Risk on Wall Street, 3 NAT’L AFFAIRS 20, 21 (2010).
155 See Bureau van Dijk Elec. Publ’g, 2012, BANKSCOPE, https://bankscope2-bvdep-com.
ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/version-2012424/Search.QuickSearch.serv?_CID=1&context=3F
S67PLLKTGTIC5 (last visited Apr. 27, 2012).
156 See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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Both the CPP and the French SPPE demonstrated how political pressure
can be coupled with attractive investment terms to induce healthy, systemi-
cally important institutions to participate in the recapitalization. The SPPE
approach, which incorporated the additional element of risk-differentiated
investment terms, is probably more desirable in light of the cost-reducing
and moral hazard benefits outlined in Section IV.A above.
D. Dangers of Similar Treatment for Small and Large Banks
Large and small banks need to be recapitalized under different terms,
tailored to their respective needs and ability to repay. Unlike large busi-
nesses, small businesses are often privately held or thinly traded, and have
limited access to the private capital necessary to reimburse the Treasury
under the current CPP terms.157 To effectively provide relief to small banks,
the Treasury needs to provide access to capital on more appropriate terms.
An example of such a recapitalization scheme is the U.S. Small Business
Lending Fund, a 2010 program that injected $30 billion into businesses with
assets of less than $10 billion through preferred stock or its equivalent.158
Under the terms of the program, the dividend rate is initially capped at five
percent, and the rate falls to as low as one percent if the bank increases its
small-business lending activity.159 As of March 31, 2012, 137 small banks
have used the Small Business Lending Fund to refinance and exit from the
CPP, citing the new program as more appropriate for promoting credit avail-
ability for healthy small businesses.160
E. Advantages of Direct Lending to SMEs and Credit Mediation
The lending requirements attached to the comparative recapitalization
schemes did not appear to have effectively increased the provision of credit
to SMEs. In fact, lending targets can even be counter-productive. As the
Japanese experience illustrates, where the real economy is stressed, lending
targets may force banks to lend to insolvent businesses, thereby increasing
the number of non-performing loans and turning healthy banks into un-
healthy ones.161 It is perhaps possible to establish lending criteria to elimi-
nate the risk of imprudent lending. However, if the demand for credit is low,
157 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 3; OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL R
INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-QR-12-02, TARP AND
SBLF: IMPACT ON COMMUNITY BANKS 6–7 (2009).
158 See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MAY OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT
CRUNCH AND THE IMPACT OF THE TARP 67 (2010).
159 Id. at 67–68.
160 See id. at 67–68; see also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, supra note 157, at 3. R
161 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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beneficiary banks may find it difficult or impossible to reach a non-trivial
target and avoid a potential penalty.
The French experience suggests that direct government loans and in-
creased loan guarantees for SMEs, as well as credit mediation, can more
effectively produce positive lending results.162 Unlike top-down approaches
that seek to incentivize bank lending, direct government loans can limit the
effects of discouraged demand and maintain socially beneficial credit stan-
dards. In the United States, such an intervention can be effected through the
Small Business Administration (“SBA”), which has historically provided di-
rect lending to small businesses and now provides guarantees for SME loans
up to $5 million.163 In 2009, the U.S. government increased the public guar-
antee for qualified loans and eliminated fees for participants, but the amount
allocated by Congress—$730 million—was too small to produce an ef-
fect.164 By contrast, the French government injected C=10 billion into OSEO
Garantie.165 The twenty-five percent increase in SBA loan volume between
2009 and 2010 suggests that a larger allocation of funds and the re-introduc-
tion of direct lending to small businesses could have significantly acceler-
ated the post-crisis recovery of SME lending in the United States.166
F. Prepare for Multiple Tranches.
Finally, most of the recapitalization programs analyzed ultimately re-
quired more than one tranche of capital injections. This can be due to the
insufficient size of the initial tranche, as many have suggested for the Japa-
nese experience,167 or to deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. Additional
tranches have often taken the form of financial instruments ranked pari
passu with ordinary shares, raising concerns about the government’s voting
stake and role as a major shareholder.168 Preparations for additional tranches
162 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
163 See Robb Mandelbaum, Why Won’t the S.B.A. Lend Directly to Small Businesses?,
N.Y. TIMES YOU’RE THE BOSS BLOG (March 10, 2010, 4:39 AM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.
com/2010/03/10/why-wont-the-s-b-a-loan-directly-to-small-businesses; General Small Busi-
ness Loans 7(a): 7(a) Loan Amounts, Fees & Interest Rates, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://
www.sba.gov/content/7a-loan-amounts-fees-interest-rates (last visited Mar. 26, 2013).
164 See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE AND FINANCIAL INFORMA-
TION: 2009 FISCAL YEAR 15 (2010).
165 Decision, supra note 130, at 78. R
166 See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE AND FINANCIAL INFORMA-
TION: FISCAL YEAR 2010 1 (2011) (the amount of loans supported by the agency increased
from $17.9 billion (2009) to $22.4 billion (2010)). Direct lending to SMEs has been increas-
ingly debated as a vehicle for increasing credit provision; the Obama Administration has re-
sisted because of the additional bureaucracy direct lending would introduce and its belief that
the federal government should not be involved in selecting which businesses receive loans and
which do not. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 158, at 79. R
167 See, e.g., Hoshi & Kashyap, supra note 25, at 411. R
168 See, e.g., Peter Thal Larsen & Jane Croft, RBS Taps UK Treasury for £25.5bn, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae796b5c-03d7-11de-845b-000077b07
658.html#axzz1t3j3H9RZ (summarizing the U.K.’s decision to cap its voting stake in RBS at
75 percent).
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in budgeting and management considerations will likely be helpful for a fu-
ture recapitalization.
V. CONCLUSION
In the four and a half years since the passage of TARP, U.S. policymak-
ers have taken important steps towards empowering bank regulators and
strengthening the financial system. Reform considerations, however, have
myopically excluded the worst-case scenario where the government is once
again forced to rescue the financial industry. Given the complexity of finan-
cial supervision and the difficulty of achieving an orderly resolution, it
seems unlikely that taxpayer bailouts can be permanently taken off the table.
An optimistic commitment to a “no-bailout” future may thus cause the Trea-
sury to be inadequately prepared when the next financial crisis arises.
This Article argued that if a future large-scale bailout of the financial
sector is again needed, the Treasury should not re-implement TARP’s signa-
ture initiative, the CPP, without significant changes. The CPP, after all, fell
short of achieving the basic goals of a government recapitalization—ensur-
ing a prompt return to normalcy, stimulating the real economy through lend-
ing, and mitigating moral hazard. Through a survey of alternative
recapitalization approaches adopted by other countries facing similar cir-
cumstances, this Article suggested six reforms to improve the effectiveness
of the CPP. The most important is the first suggestion: differentiating be-
tween beneficiaries’ risk-profiles in the financial and non-financial terms of
the investments. As this Article showed, access to capital at identical rates
and terms, regardless of financial health, has a substantial impact on the
incentives faced by financial institutions and their investors. Distorted incen-
tives will, in turn, cause the economy to be more susceptible to a future
crisis.
In many ways, the long-term effects of the recent government interven-
tions have yet to be revealed and further analysis is needed. Going forward,
efforts should, in particular, be directed at comparing the extent to which the
various recapitalization approaches encouraged excessive risk-taking and re-
warded complexity. Consideration should also be given to minimizing the
length of financial ownership in distressed firms. Such ownership, if held for
a prolonged period, can create confusion between the government’s regula-
tory and shareholder roles and distort market competition.
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